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Abstract. Damages claims (compensation) for breaches of Articles 101 or 102 of the 
Treaty (direct effect) create an important sphere of private enforcement of EU competition 
law. The Directive seeks to ensure the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules by 
optimising the interaction between the public and private enforcement of competition law 
and ensuring obtain full compensation by victims of infringements of the EU competition 
rules for the harm they suffered. However, the effectiveness of filing a civil action before 
the national courts depends on many factors, including in particular the extent of access to 
documents collected in connection with the public law. Practical implementation of these 
rules in the interest of economically disadvantaged individuals is far from consistency. In 
the article the accent has been put on the problem of access barriers victims of competition 
breaches to the documents collected in connection administrative action. Does the Directive 
remove the fundamental barriers to access to information? To ensure effective private 
enforcement actions under civil law and effective public enforcement by competition 
authorities, both instruments are required to synergy to ensure maximum effectiveness of 
the competition rules. It is necessary to regulate, adequately, the way the two forms of 
enforcement are coordinated. The mutual interplay at Union level will also avoid 
divergence of applicable rules, which could jeopardise the proper functioning of the EU 
internal market. 
Keywords. Competition, Access to information, Damages, Effectiveness, Litigation. 
JEL. K21, K41, L49. 
 
1. Introduction 
U normative order, shaped by the case law - The Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings – which 
sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm 
caused by an infringement of competition law by an undertaking (association of 
undertakings), can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation for that 
harm from that undertaking (association). It also sets out rules fostering undistorted 
competition in the internal market and removing obstacles to its proper functioning 
by ensuring equivalent protection throughout the Union for anyone who has 
suffered such harm. 
 
 
 
2. The right to compensation. The consistency of the 
application of TFEU   
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According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, any person can claim 
compensation for harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that 
harm and an infringement of the competition law. Damages claims for breaches of 
Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( 
http://www.lisbon-treaty.org) constitute an important area of private enforcement 
of EU competition law and and are complementary to public law character (Case 
C-453/99, Courage and Crehan; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi; 
Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt; Case C-536/11 
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG; opinion Advocate General 
delivered in case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines). It follows from the direct 
effect of the prohibitions laid down in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty that any 
individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered, where there is a causal 
relationship between that harm and an infringement of the EU competition rules. 
The right to compensation is recognised for any natural or legal person ‐ consumer 
and undertakings, irrespective of the existence of a direct contractual relationship 
with the infringing undertaking (The term ‘undertaking’ must be understood as 
designating an economic unit, in the context of competition law, even if in law that 
economic unit consists of several natural or legal persons, judgments in: Case 
170/83 Hydrotherm Gerätebau; Case C‑520/09 P Arkema v Commission; Case C‑
231/14 P InnoLux Corp. v Commission) and regardless of whether or not there has 
been a prior finding of an infringement by a competition authority. Actions for 
damages for infringements of national or Union competition law typically require a 
complex factual and economic analysis (Zimmer, 2012). The evidence necessary to 
prove a claim for damages is often held exclusively by the opposing party or by 
third parties, and is not sufficiently known by and accessible to the claimant. In 
such circumstances, strict legal requirements for claimants to assert in detail all the 
facts of their case at the beginning of an action and to proffer precisely specified 
pieces of supporting evidence can unduly impede the effective exercise of the right 
to compensation guaranteed by the Treaty. 
The effectiveness and consistency of the application of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU by the Commission and the national competition authorities require a 
common approach across the Union on disclosure of evidence that is included in 
the file of a competition authority. Disclosure of evidence to third parties should 
not significantly detract enforcement of competition law by the competition 
authority. Guarantees the effectiveness of competition authorities in the public 
interest includes the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 by introducing an 
enforcement system that is based on the direct application of the EU competition 
rules in their entirety and creating authorization Member States’ competition 
authorities and national courts to apply all aspects of EU competition rules. There 
is a problem, whether legislative work at EU level aimed in the right direction to 
improve the conditions for private claims. In the explanatory memorandum of 
Proposal for a Directive refers to the judgment in Pfleiderer, in which the CJEU 
has ruled that the provisions of European Union law on cartels, and in particular 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU (see 
also Communication from the Commission), must be interpreted as not precluding 
a person who has been adversely affected by an infringement of European Union 
competition law and is seeking to obtain damages from being granted access to 
documents relating to a leniency procedure involving the perpetrator of that 
infringement (In another way W.P.J. Wils, 2003. In the doctrine are also opinions 
on the need to legalize leniency and to make amendments to the legal basis 
Waelbroeck, (2006)). The proposal has the following two objectives 
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(complementary golas): „to make that EU right to compensation a reality in all 
Member States by removing key practical difficulties which consumers and 
companies frequently face when they seek redress” and another one focused on 
„optimising the interplay of such private damages claims with the public 
enforcement by the Commission and national competition authorities, to safeguard 
strong public enforcement and to achieve a more effective enforcement overall”  
(Report from the Commission). It is, however, for the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States, on the basis of their national law, to determine the conditions 
under which such access must be permitted or refused by weighing the interests 
protected by European Union law (According to prejudicial jurisdiction of EU 
Court of Justice, the court of a Member State should take action ex officio when it 
is necessary to guarantee the substantive standards of protection, and also when 
national law does not give grounds for it, Frąckowiak & Stefanicki (2011). In 
Pfleiderer also CJEU stated that, in keeping with the principle of effectiveness, it is 
necessary to ensure that the applicable national rules do not operate in such a way 
as to make it practically impossible or excessively difficult (Some reviews 
provided by Member States indicate that real difficulties in obtaining evidence is a 
major obstacle to the investigation of injury include in Belgium, France, Italy. 
More Waelbroeck et al (2004). That weighing-up exercise can be conducted by the 
national courts and tribunals only on a case-by-case basis, according to national 
law, and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case. The interpretation 
applied by the CJEU allows for flexible application of the law and identifies areas 
in which further progress can be made. 
 
3. Optimising the interaction between the public and 
private enforcement  
Otherwise adopted in the explanatory memorandum of the Proposal for a 
Directive indicated that, such an approach, as the juridical balancing „could lead to 
discrepancies between and even within Member States regarding the disclosure of 
evidence from the files of competition authorities. Moreover, the resulting 
uncertainty as to the disclosability of leniency-related information is likely to 
influence an undertaking’s choice whether or not to cooperate with the competition 
authorities under their leniency programme”. This position should be closely linked 
to the objectives of the Directive 2014/104/EU for both tools are required to 
interact to ensure maximum effectiveness of the competition rules and ensuring 
that victims of infringements of the EU competition rules can obtain full 
compensation for the harm they suffered. The European Parliament has clarified in 
Legislative Resolution of 17 April 2014 that full compensation under directive 
shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, multiple or 
other types of damages. With the approach of EU authorities due to give preference 
implementation of the public interest in competition law, some Member States 
have rules similar to the rules set out in the proposal for a european document. 
Although it sets clear and uniform standards for member states access to the 
documents to third parties, but this does not mean that the application of the 
Directive removes the barrier of information and there is a positive step in terms of 
effective access to court. It does not meet the requirement of a consistent approach 
to the implementation of these rules, both in the interests of individual victims, as 
well as in the public interest. Not taken into account in the balancing of sanctions 
on both grounds, consequently, this may lead to an excessive financial burden on 
the company infringing competition rules. Noteworthy is CJEU judgment of 6 June 
2013 on the Donau Chemie AG. This request that in proceedings under Article 
267 TFEU concerns the interpretation of the principles of effectiveness and 
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equivalence in the light of the rules applicable in the Austrian legal system to 
actions for damages in respect of a breach of European Union competition law. 
Paragraph 39(2) of the Kartellgesetz 2005 states: Persons, who are not parties to 
the procedure, may gain access to the files of the Cartel Court only with the 
consent of the parties (http://www.jusline.at/Kartellgesetz_(KartG).html). The 
parties to the judicial proceedings, based on the cited provision, in essence refused 
to consent to the applicant being granted access to the file (See 
http://www.jusline.at/Zivilprozessordnung_(ZPO).html). Morever when national 
courts order the public authority to disclose evidence, the principles of legal and 
administrative cooperation under national or Union law are applicable (so the 
proposal for a directive on 17 April 2014). 
The referring Austrian Court states that paragraph 39(2) of the Kartellgesetz 
makes no allowance for the court to authorise access to the judicial case file in 
competition cases without the consent of the parties, even where the party seeking 
access can demonstrate a legitimate legal interest in having documents. The Court 
accordingly is in some doubt as the compatibility of paragraph 39(2) of the 
Kartellgesetz with that interpretation of the applicable European Union law, given 
that that provision precludes the court from the main proceeding with any 
weighing-up of the colliding interests. In those circumstances decided to stay the 
proceedings and to refer the questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The 
court asks, in essence, whether European Union law, in particular the principle of 
effectiveness (More in the exchange of experience and information aimed at the 
effective exercise of the right of competition ICN Cartels Working Group, 2010 – 
2011), precludes a provision of national law under which access to documents 
forming part of the file relating to national proceedings concerning the application 
of Article 101 TFEU, including access to documents made available under a 
leniency programme, by third parties who are not party to those proceedings with a 
view to bringing an action for damages against participants in an agreement or 
concerted practice is made solely subject to the consent of all the parties to those 
proceedings (on the sidelines with this approach, there is a problem cooperation 
(and confidentiality) with other jurisdictions, for example, generally, the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010) must not disclose to third parties any 
information given to it in confidence or obtained under its investigative powers, 
unless it has obtained consent to do so. However, there are a number of important 
exceptions to this rule, including with regard to international cooperation, Guirguis 
& McCowan (2014), without leaving any possibility for the common courts of the 
Member States of weighing up the interests involved. Where victims violation of 
competition have no alternative path of obtaining that evidence, a refusal to grant 
them access to the file renders nugatory the right to compensation which they 
derive directly from European Union law. 
 
4. Attractiveness of leniency 
In general, a key obstacle to the access of individuals to documents is to 
maintain the attractiveness of leniency. The European Commission and Court of 
Justice states that programs of voluntary cooperation are useful tools if efforts to 
uncover and bring an end to infringements of competition rules are to be effective 
and thus serve the objective of effective application of competition rules 
(Commission has an interest in maintaining the attractiveness of these procedures 
for business, Commission Staff Working Document, 2013, (Chassaing, 2013). The 
effectiveness of those programmes could be compromised if documents relating to 
leniency proceedings were disclosed to persons wishing to bring an action for 
damages (Otherwise Ashton, & Henry, 2013). The Court of Justice essentially 
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states that there is a risk that access to evidence contained in a file in competition 
proceedings which is necessary as a basis for those actions may undermine the 
effectiveness of a leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to 
the competent competition authority (See also Lenaerts, et al 2014). There are 
rightly argues in the literature that a formalized system of access to information 
leads to a significant prolongation of the proceedings, compare Bar & 
Zimmermann, (2002). Protection of leniency cannot justify a refusal to grant access 
to that evidence. On those grounds, CJEU in judgment of 6 June 2013 on the 
Donau Chemie AG held that European Union law, in particular the principle of 
effectiveness, precludes a provision of national law under which access to 
documents forming part of the file relating to national proceedings concerning the 
application of Article 101 TFEU, including access to documents made available 
under a leniency programme, by third parties who are not party to those 
proceedings with a view to bringing an action for damages against participants in 
an agreement or concerted practice is made subject solely to the consent of all the 
parties to those proceedings, without leaving any possibility for the national courts 
of weighing up the interests involved. This argument is in line with the position of 
the European Parliament (Report on 27 February 2014). that transparency remains 
the rule (Vandenborre & Goetz, 2013), including in relation to a cartel leniency 
programme; whereas an automatic ban on disclosure is a violation of the rule of 
transparency, as laid down in the Treaties; whereas secrecy is the exception, and 
must be justified on a case-by-case basis by national judges with regard to actions 
for damages (Cauffman, 2011). However, the German and British examples 
illustrate a certain prudence national judges face to requests for access to 
documents relating to leniency (Chassaing, 2013). 
The merit of the Court of Justice is not only shaping the concept of a private 
road the implementation of the competition rules under the provisions of the Treaty 
as complementary instruments to public competition, but also to develop rules that 
would make the real effectiveness of compensation claims of breaches of 
competition (Inter alia class actions backed by litigation funders are now an 
established part of the Australian cartel private enforcement landscape, Guirguis & 
McCowan, (2014). From this point of view, could cause an axiological problem 
judgment of the Court of 27 February 2014 (Case C-365/12 P, European 
Commission v EnBW Energie), the appeal brought by the European Commission 
from a judgment of 22 May 2012 (Compare Report on 27 February 2014. The EU 
legislation on access to documents is still not being properly applied by the 
Union’s administration; whereas the exceptions of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
are being applied routinely rather than exceptionally by the administration). By its 
appeal, the Commission seeks to have set aside the judgment of the Court of the 
European Union, by which that court annulled Commission decision refusing the 
request made by EnBW Energie BadenWürttemberg AG for access to the case-file, 
which considers it self to have been affected by a cartel. The injured abuses sought 
from the Commission, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, access to all 
documents in the file relating to the administrative proceeding. The Commission, 
an authority has territorial jurisdiction to proceed against in situation which has the 
object and effect of restricting competition within the internal market within the 
meaning of Article 101 TFEU, rejected that request.  At that decision, the 
Commission stated that it could see nothing that indicated that there was an 
overriding public interest in disclosure of the documents requested, for the 
purposes of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (The requirement of 
proportionality should protect against the negative effects of overly broad and 
burden some entity holding the information disclosure obligations, including secure 
communication system (information flow) against the danger of abuse, Bael 
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(2010). EnBW Energie BadenWürttemberg AG brought an action to Court for the 
annulment of the contested decision. CJEU considered in that connection whether 
the conditions which must be fulfilled to enable the Commission to dispense with a 
specific, individual examination of the documents in the contested decision were 
met in the present case. Consequently, as the The Court was fully entitled to find, 
that the Commission was not entitled to general presumption, without undertaking 
a specific analysis of each document, that all the documents requested were clearly 
covered by exceptions of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.  In accordance 
with settled European Union case-law, since they derogate from the principle of the 
widest possible public access to documents, the exceptions to the right of access, 
laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001, must be interpreted and 
applied strictly (Paragraph 41 of the judgment of 22 May 2012 in Case T-344/08 
and cases cited there). It is open to the institution concerned to base its decisions in 
that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of document, 
since similar general considerations are likely to apply to requests for disclosure 
documents of the same nature. 
The Commission gives the primacy of the protection of documents obtained 
under the leniency program. In refusing to grant access to documents provided in 
the context of an application for immunity or leniency, the Commission relied on 
abstract considerations relating to the harm that might be caused to leniency 
programmes if the persons and undertakings concerned could not be confident that 
those documents would not be made widely accessible. EnBW asserts, to the 
contrary, that without those documents it could not even attempt to bring an action 
for damages that would have the slightest chance of succeeding widely Emmerich 
(2012) in respect of the losses that it claims to have suffered as a result of the cartel 
censured by the issuing authority. The Court, the judgment under appeal, stated 
that „acceptance of the interpretation proposed by the Commission would amount 
to permitting the latter to exclude its entire activity in the area of competition from 
the application of Regulation No 1049/2001, without any limit in time, merely by 
reference to a possible future adverse impact on its leniency programme”. 
According to the Court (Why the leniency procedure does not make much interest, 
it seems that the American point of view can be helpful, broadly Piszcz (2013), 
consequences which the Commission fears for its leniency programme depend on a 
number of uncertain factors, including, in particular, the use that the parties 
prejudiced by a cartel will make of the documents obtained, the success of any 
actions which they may bring for damages, the amounts which will be awarded 
them by the national courts and the way in which undertakings participating in 
cartels will react in future”. Thus the protection of leniency must be tied with all 
component parts of the effective application of competition law (In light of the case 
law, the right to damages for breach of the competition rules is a subjective law 
which national courts have a duty to protect, Carpagnano (2006) Szpunar (2008). 
 
 5. Arguments protected public law proceedings 
      Refused access to documents Commission argues protected public law 
proceedings. Meanwhile article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 draws a clear 
distinction by reference to whether a procedure has been closed or not. Thus, 
according to the first subparagraph of that provision, any document drawn up by an 
institution for internal use or received by it, which relates to a matter where the 
decision has not been taken by the institution, falls within the scope of the 
exception for protecting the decision-making process (It should be emphasized at 
this point that there are demands a special procedure for the conduct of antitrust 
Stankiewicz (2012). The second subparagraph of that provision provides that, after 
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the decision has been taken, the exception at issue covers only documents 
containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary 
consultations within the institution concerned. According to the Court only for part 
of the documents for internal use, namely those containing opinions as part of 
deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned, that 
the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) allows access to be refused even after the 
decision has been taken, where disclosure of the documents would seriously 
undermine the decision-making process of that institution. The condition that the 
violation was serious significantly limits the scope of discretionary power of 
authority (Will the effect discretionary remedialism be even more devastating 
for the coherence and legitimacy of competition law, in view of the increasing role 
of private enforcement…? On the concept „discretionary remedialism” Lianos, 
(2011); Birks, (2000). By its appeal, the Commission claims that the Court should 
set aside the judgment of 22 May 2012 under appeal in so far as, by that judgment, 
the Court annulled the contested decision and dismiss the application for 
annulment brought before the Court by EnBW Energie BadenWürttemberg AG and 
give a final ruling.  The Commission's complaints relate to failure to have regard to 
the need for a harmonious interpretation of Regulation No 1049/2001 in order to 
ensure that legislative provisions relating to other areas remain fully effective; an 
error of law in the examination of the existence of a general presumption 
applicable to all documents in the file relating to concerted practices proceedings; 
infringement of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, concerning relating to 
the protection of the purpose of investigations (From the point of view worthy of 
legal protection for the plaintiff's interest in the relevant outpatient claims, it is 
important to provide him or directly to the court, the relevant information with 
regard to the infringement of competition law, its nature and scope, as well as the 
investigation of compensation and the likelihood of success imparted action, 
Waelbroeck et al (2004). In particular, it may be dependent on the introduction of 
the institution of collective redress and effective functioning of this model:  
(Stadler, 2007) likewise the exception relating to the protection of commercial 
interests. The Commission also alleges infringement of Article 4(3) of the 
regulation, concerning the exception relating to the protection of the Commission’s 
decision-making process (it is worth noting at this point in the continental law 
system, basically, there is an obligation to provide (in the first)  written statement 
of claim or defence (relevant documents) on pain of losing  rights of their use in 
court proceedings, more Stefanicki (2014). 
The Commission submits that the judgment under appeal disregarded the need 
to interpret harmoniously Regulation No 1049/2001, 1/2003 and 773/2004, 
concerning concerted practices. According to the Commission the Court was 
mindful only of the principle that exceptions to the right of access to documents 
must be interpreted strictly, thus giving Regulation No 1049/2001 precedence over 
those other regulations. That approach, according to the applicant authority, is 
incorrect, since the provisions of that regulation should be interpreted in such a 
way as to ensure the full application of the various relevant special legislative 
provisions. Contrary to the Commission’s assertions, Advocate General in opinion 
delivered on 3 October 2013 states, that the Court’s interpretation of Regulation 
No 1049/2001, did not fail to take into consideration the specific rules governing 
access to the proceedings in which the documents in question were generated. 
Whether that attempt to interpret the regulation in a harmonious way achieved the 
desired effect is another matter (That is something that must be decided once we 
have examined the other grounds of appeal, which relate to alleged errors of law 
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arising out of a misinterpretation of Regulation No 1049/2001). Has the political 
dialogue with national Parliaments has proved its worth since it was launched? 
Tribunal stated that Regulation No 1049/2001 is designed to confer on the 
public as wide a right of access as possible to documents of the institutions, 
especially the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European 
Council.. It is also apparent from that regulation, in particular from Article 4 
thereof, which lays down exceptions in that regard, that the right of access is 
nevertheless subject to certain limits based on reasons of important public or 
private interest. With well-established case-law flow results, that in order to justify 
refusal of access to a document the disclosure of which has been requested, the 
institution concerned must also provide explanations as to how access to that 
document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an 
exception laid down in that article. The Court has already acknowledged the 
existence in that type of situation (It is important to note that, according to settled 
case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless 
such treatment is objectively justified, see judgment in case:  C‑550/07 P Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission; T ‑ 456/10 Timab 
Industries, Cie financière et de participations Roullier v European Commission), 
the recognition that there is a general presumption that the disclosure of documents 
of a certain nature will, in principle, undermine the protection of one of the 
interests listed in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001. The presumption enables 
the institution concerned to deal with a global application and to reply thereto 
accordingly (Moreover, referring to thesettled case-law, a simple presumption of 
legality attaches to any statement of the institutions relating to the non-existence of 
documents requested, see judgments in case T‑110/03, T‑150/03 and T‑405/03 
Sison v Council, case T‑214/13 Rainer Typke v European Commission). The 
Court of Justice held that a court in the judgment under appeal committed an error 
of law by concluding, that the Commission was not entitled to presume that all the 
documents concerned were covered by the exceptions provided for in the first and 
third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The Court of Justice 
agreed with part of the Court's argument, that any person is entitled to claim 
compensation for the loss caused to him by a breach of Article 81 EC (101 TFEU). 
Such a right strengthens the working of the EU competition rules, thereby making a 
significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the 
European Union (Providing the Commission's factual support for the institution of 
compensation payments should be linked to optimal official coordination in the 
public interest and private enforcement, Denozza & Toffoletti, (2009). 
Nevertheless, such general considerations are not, as such, capable of prevailing 
over the reasons justifying the refusal to disclose the documents in question. It 
follows that any person seeking compensation for the loss caused by a breach of 
competition rules must establish that it is necessary for that person to be granted 
access to documents in the Commission’s file, in order to enable the latter to weigh 
up, on a case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favour of disclosure of such 
documents and in favour of the protection of those documents, taking into account 
all the relevant factors in the case. 
Advocate General in opinion delivered on 3 October 2013 states that we have a 
situation involving a refusal on principle that makes it impossible for a specific 
request for access, presented as the only possible basis for a claim for dama ges, to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the relevant factors in 
the case. Against the foregoing it could be argued that the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes can be safeguarded only if it is guaranteed that, as a general rule, the 
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documentation provided will be used by the Commission alone. However, other 
safeguards should also be considered that are less extensive but still attractive for 
those wanting to take advantage of those programmes. Advocate General observes 
that in the final analysis, the rationale underlying programs of voluntary 
cooperation is a calculation as to the extent of the harm that might arise from an 
infringement of competition law (The trust form of organization, more flexible than 
a corporation, may also provide tax advantages, Gillen (2011).  Also in this aspect 
of the problem is trans national. Considered in those terms, to guarantee that the 
information provided to the Commission can be passed on to third parties only if 
they can adequately prove that they need it in order to bring an action for damages 
could constitute a sufficient safeguard, particularly considering that the alternative 
might be a penalty higher than that which might ensue were the action for damages 
to be successful (When determining the function performed by each of the 
instruments of competition there can not be overlooked that the new emerging 
trends should reflect national traditions and current and foreseeable with a high 
probability of their occurrence needs. An example would be to compare the 
European experience not only with the U.S. but also Japanese. The last points to 
compensate and recover the status quo ante than punishment –Walle (2013). To 
sum up Advocate General position in the opinion states that the objective of 
maximum effectiveness for that mechanism should not be regarded as justification 
for a complete sacrifice of the rights of those concerned to be compensated and, 
more generally, for an impairment of their rights to an effective remedy under 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Also 
European Parliament, Resolution of 27 February 2014, emphasis on interpretations 
of Regulation 1049/2001 in accordance with the fundamental rights and 
emphasises that the right to good administration also entails a duty on the 
authorities to inform citizens of their fundamental rights. (see Andreangeli, 2008). 
The concept of good administration consists of a good law and way to enforce it). 
The Court set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 
22 May 2012.  
 
6. The lack of information as one of the main obstacles  
Having regard to the above judgment and the Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union can 
not be ignored the position of the European Parliament in explanatory statement of 
Report on 27 February 2014 on public access to documents. Secrecy and discretion 
belong to an era when Europe was built by diplomats and civil servants. 
Admittedly, as transparent administration benefits the interests of citizens, the fight 
against corruption and the legitimacy of the Union’s political system and 
legislation but current legislation, notably the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (on 
public access to documents), is not properly applied by the Union’s institutions. As 
case law reveals, the institutions often still apply the exceptions to transparency in 
a general, rather than in a specifically motivated, manner. Partial access to 
documents is too often considered. In this material, the emphasis was laid on, 
existing at the victims, a lack of information necessary for the purposes of 
compensation proceedings, as one of the main obstacles to the effective 
implementation of competition rules (The actual guarantees effective redress 
private enforcement, designated predictability jurisprudence, the quality of judicial 
decisions and the frequency of paid claims may cause a deterrent effect. Thus, to 
fulfill the specified function is dependent on the actual making use of private 
institutions of compensation, Davis & Lande (2012). To remedy the information 
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asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying antitrust harm, 
and to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages, it is appropriate to presume 
that in the case of a cartel infringement, such infringement resulted in harm, in 
particular via a price effect (the proposal for a directive on 17 April 2014). It is 
worth noting judgement of the Court on 5 June 2014, that article 101 TFEU must 
be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the interpretation and application of 
domestic legislation enacted by a Member State which categorically excludes, for 
legal reasons, any civil liability of undertakings belonging to a cartel for loss 
resulting from the fact that an undertaking not party to the cartel, having regard to 
the practices of the cartel, set its prices higher than would otherwise have been 
expected under competitive conditions (Case C‑557/12, Kone AG). 
 
7. Conclusion 
It should be noted the divergence between the line of case-law of the Court of 
Justice, adopted on Pfleiderer AG and Donau Chemie AG and rules in this regard 
contained in the Directive and judgement on 27 February 2014 in EnBW Energie 
Baden-Württemberg AG case (Member States now have until 27 December 2016 
to implement it. Thanks to the Directive, it will be easier for European citizens and 
companies to receive effective compensation for the harm caused by antitrust 
violations - we find such the opinion expressed in the Report on Competition 
Policy 2014 and so the Directive is the first legislative initiative adopted via the 
ordinary legislative procedure in the area of competition policy, and, in European 
Commission point of view, it sets a milestone for the competition dialogue between 
the Commission and the other EU institutions). In the latter proposed solutions are 
clearly aimed at strengthening public enforcement of the competition and favoring 
leniency program. EU authorities often use the exceptions to the rule of 
transparency as a principle, not as a particular solution, without sufficient reasons 
for this state of affairs. The European Parliament shows directly a quick and light 
procedure must be foreseen for challenging a refusal for access to documents, so as 
to reduce lengthy and costly litigation. Finally may arise doubts as to whether the 
chosen direction is a reflection of the will of the Member States, in connection with 
the far-reaching interference in private law. 
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